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Cooperative NRDA & New 
Governance 
GETTING TO RESTORATION IN THE HUDSON 
RIVER, THE GULF OF MEXICO, AND BEYOND 
Michael B. Runnels† 
Andrea Giampetro-Meyer‡ 
INTRODUCTION 
In December 2010, General Electric Company (GE) 
announced that it would proceed to Phase Two of a two-part 
plan to remove toxic polychlorinated biphenyls, or PCBs, from 
the Hudson River. The company had released the toxins into a 
forty-mile stretch of the river over thirty years earlier.1 After 
decades of fighting, GE finally decided to use its innovative 
drive, technical expertise, and economic resources to clean and 
restore the pollution’s damage.2  
Less than a year earlier, and fifteen hundred miles 
away, British Petroleum (BP) was making initial preparations 
to respond to a massive oil spill. Starting in April 2010, the 
spill yielded eighty-six days of nearly uncontrolled gushing.3 
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 ‡ Professor and Chair, Law & Social Responsibility Department, Sellinger 
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 1 Editorial, A Great Day for the River, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2010, at A22, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/28/opinion/28tue2.html [hereinafter Great Day]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 For recent law review articles that analyze the Deepwater Horizon 
disaster, see, for example, Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon 
Blowout: There Ought to Be a Law, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2010) (considering why three 
laws—the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Outer Continental Shelf 
Leasing Act (OCSLA), and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA)—failed “to prevent and cope 
with the explosion of the drilling rig, Deepwater Horizon”). Houck highlights “the 
power of negative thinking,” or worst-case analysis. Id. at 17-18; see also Sam Kalen et 
al., Lingering Relevance of the Coastal Zone Management Act to Energy Development in 
Our Nation’s Coastal Waters?, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 73 (2010) (considering the role of the 
states “to influence energy development occurring off their coasts” under the Coastal 
Zone Management Act); Stanley A. Millan, Escaping the “Black Hole” in the Gulf, 24 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 41 (2010) (“explor[ing] the reaches of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,” 
and how this law and state analogues address oil disasters and consequent damages). 
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This disaster in the Gulf of Mexico made clear that while BP 
had invested billions into sophisticated drilling technologies,4 it 
had failed to invest in the technologies necessary to deal with 
what ultimately became the largest oil spill in U.S. history—a 
spill that continues to threaten marine life and adjacent 
wetlands in the Gulf.5  
Federal laws strive to hold polluters accountable. In 
particular, Congress has enacted laws that make polluters liable 
for the injury, destruction, or loss of natural resources resulting 
from hazardous substances’ release into the environment. For 
instance, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act6 (CERCLA, or Superfund7) 
concerns waste sites, and the 1990 Oil Pollution Act8 (OPA) 
  
For recent, more journalistic articles that anticipate the legal fallout from the 
Deepwater Horizon spill, see, for example, Allison Torres Burtka, Ripple Effect, TRIAL, 
Aug. 2010, at 42; Stephen Gidiere, Mike Freeman & Mary Samuels, The Coming Wave 
of Gulf Coast Oil Spill Litigation, 71 ALA. LAW. 374 (2010).  
 4 Katie Howell, Oil Spill Containment, Cleanup Technology Has Failed to 
Keep the Pace, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/04/30/ 
30greenwire-oil-spill-containment-cleanup-technology-has-f-95687.html. 
 5 See generally Carrie Presnall, Laura López-Hoffman & Marc L. Miller, Can 
the Deepwater Horizon Trust Take Account of Ecosystem Services and Fund Restoration 
of the Gulf?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,129 (2010). Presnall, López-
Hoffman, and Miller encourage Mr. Feinberg, administrator of the Deepwater Horizon 
Oil Spill Trust and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF), “to account for ecosystem 
services when assessing . . . harms,” and they describe strategies and mechanisms for 
assessing harms. Id. at 11,130-31. “Ecosystem services are the benefits humans receive 
from functioning ecosystems and the species that comprise them.” Id. at 11,130. These 
services include “seafood, flood control, carbon sequestration, habitat for resident and 
migrating wildlife, hunting, sport fishing, wildlife watching and other outdoor 
recreation, a rich local culture, and more.” Id.  
 6 CERCLA provides for the cleanup of sites contaminated by hazardous 
substances. It: (1) authorizes the federal government to clean up sites using the 
Hazardous Substance Superfund, (2) imposes liability for cleanup on responsible 
parties, (3) requires responsible parties to perform the cleanup and reimburse others or 
the fund for the costs of cleanup, and (4) requires responsible parties to pay damages to 
state and federal governments for injury to natural resources, including compensation 
for destruction or loss. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006). 
 7 For more information on the Superfund, see Kathleen Chandler Schmid, 
The Depletion of the Superfund and Natural Resource Damages, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 
483 (2008) (explaining how the depletion of the Superfund has impacted CERCLA 
remediation and describing how some states have created programs to recover natural 
resource damages). 
 8 OPA imposes liability for removal costs and damages resulting from an 
incident in which “oil is discharged . . . into . . . navigable waters or adjoining 
shorelines or the exclusive economic zone.” 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006). Like CERCLA, 
OPA establishes liability for damages for injuries, or loss of, natural resources, and 
outlines liability limits in specific circumstances. Id. §§ 2701-2761. 
  For an article that explores some of the history of OPA, see Lawrence I. 
Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and Financial Responsibility Under the Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990: A Review of the First Decade, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 481 (2000) (critiquing 
OPA, while recognizing the statute’s contribution to modern oil pollution law in the 
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concerns oil spills. Both acts authorize a form of environmental 
cleanup and restoration called natural resource damage 
assessment (NRDA).9 NRDA is a legal process that determines 
the type and degree of restoration in which a polluter must 
engage to compensate the public for environmental pollution’s 
harm to natural resources.10  
The NRDA process is inherently adversarial. Companies—
often called Responsible Parties (RPs) or Potentially Responsible 
Parties (PRPs)—represent the interests of their shareholders; 
Natural Resource Trustees (Trustees) act on behalf of the public. 
But each of these parties engages in NRDA with an eye toward 
litigation under the assumption that the courts will ultimately 
decide on required remedial action and compensation. 
Neither CERCLA nor OPA requires cooperative NRDA, 
a particular approach to NRDA that emphasizes the RPs’ and 
Trustees’ need to join together and work toward the common 
goal of restoring natural resources quickly and efficiently11—to 
get to restoration.12 Three decades of adversarial Hudson River 
cleanup and restoration efforts evidence a need for cooperative 
NRDA approaches, the necessity of which is further 
underscored by the work awaiting BP in the Gulf of Mexico. 
  
United States); see also J. Terence Ryan, The Evolution of Natural Resource Damage 
Assessments Under the Oil Pollution Act and the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 29 (1994) 
(providing a synopsis of CERCLA and OPA, description of methodologies used to 
calculate penalties, and summary of judicial decision-making in the context of NRDA). 
 9 The federal Clean Water Act (CWA) and common law principles also 
authorize NRDA. NRDA 101: FAQ’s, MISS. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, NAT. RESOURCE 
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, http://www.mdeqnrda.com/faqs.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2011).  
 10 Id. 
 11 Bill Conner & Ron Gouguet, Getting to Restoration, ENVTL. F., May-June 
2004, at 18, 22. 
 12 Id. at 19. 
Companies are liable for restoring natural resource injuries beyond normal 
cleanups under Superfund and the Oil Pollution Act. But they can cause their 
financial exposure to skyrocket by instinctively using legal and scientific 
defenses to avoid liability. Instead, industry can reduce costs and government 
trustees can achieve restoration more quickly by joining together in a 
cooperative natural resource damage assessment.  
Id.; see also Carol A. Jones, Theodore D. Tomasi & Stephanie W. Fluke, Public and 
Private Claims in Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 111 
(1996) (promoting increased understanding of legal and economic principles that underlie 
public and private NRDA claims under CERCLA and OPA); Jason R. Bentley, Note, 
Examining the Role of Potentially Responsible Parties in Assessing Natural Resource 
Damages, 23 VT. L. REV. 431 (1998) (urging potentially responsible parties—PRPs—
under CERCLA to be active participants in the NRDA process in an attempt to expedite 
the process, reduce overall costs, and contribute to fair, equitable settlements). 
110 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77:1 
The purpose of this article is to examine NRDA’s 
current shortcomings and recommend reforms to incentivize 
cooperative NRDA and broader New Governance principles in 
the future. This article proceeds in four parts. Part I delineates 
the article’s theoretical underpinnings by placing cooperative 
NRDA in the context of New Governance. New Governance is a 
concept that encompasses various contemporary techniques of 
law and regulation that foster cooperation among public and 
private actors, including industries, corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) advocates, and shareholders.13 Part II 
considers the facts and relevant NRDA processes of two distinct 
cases: GE’s release of PCBs into the Hudson River and the BP 
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Part III applies a particular New 
Governance theory, Professor Edward M. Epstein’s model of 
New Governance, to the GE and BP cases. Epstein’s model 
highlights six modes of social control—law, affinity group 
regulation, self-regulation, ethical precepts, the media, and an 
  
 13 New Governance, UNIV. WIS.-MADISON: CTR. FOR WORLD AFF. & GLOBAL 
ECON., http://wage.wisc.edu/research/collaboratives/governance (last visited Aug. 21, 
2011); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance 
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004). Characterizing the 
inclusive and dynamic nature of New Governance approaches, Lobel explains: 
Rather than oppositional, [this approach] aims for an appreciative positive 
stance, pulling together disparate ingredients and synthesizing elements from 
opposing schools of thought. Through new governance approaches, 
contemporary thinkers can bring together in their research unlikely pairs, such 
as privatization and democratic theory. The theory itself is thus reflexive, in the 
sense that it calls for integration in legal practice and correspondingly 
exemplifies hybridization in the academic field. Indeed, the theoretical basis for 
[this] vision mirrors its practical application in its inclusive spirit. 
Id. at 449; see also Susan Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture of 
Learning, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 323, 328 (Gráinne de 
Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and 
Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 5 (2008); Helen Hershkoff & 
Benedict Kingsbury, Crisis, Community, and Courts in Network Governance: A Response 
to Liebman and Sabel’s Approach to Reform of Public Education, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 319, 321-24 (2003); David Hess, Social Reporting and New Governance 
Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving Corporate Accountability Through Transparency, 
17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 453, 455 (2007); Michael B. Runnels, Dispute Resolution & New 
Governance: Role of the Corporate Apology, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 481, 486-87 (2011); 
William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to 
Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 173-75 (2004). See generally THE TOOLS OF 
GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002); 
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 345-56 (1998); Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal 
Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. 
L. REV. 471 (2004); James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey 
Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183 (2003); Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New 
Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV. 498 (2004). 
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engaged civil society—that encourage corporations to engage in 
socially responsible behavior.14 Applying and analyzing Epstein’s 
New Governance model yields three recommendations that 
advance cooperative NRDA and improve corporate behavior 
beyond the GE and BP cases. In Part IV, this article therefore 
recommends the following: (1) reforming CERCLA and OPA, (2) 
reframing Epstein’s model to include science as a mode of social 
control, and (3) increasing corporate disclosure requirements. In 
addition to incentivizing more cooperative NRDA, these reforms 
will contribute to the transparency and accountability15 the 
public has come to expect in the post-Enron era.  
I. COOPERATIVE NATURAL RESOURCE RESTORATION, IN 
CONTEXT 
This section integrates New Governance theory with 
cooperative NRDA. Part A considers business reform, in 
general, and ways to encourage positive corporate behavior. 
Highlighting Epstein’s theory of New Governance, this section 
explains movements that advocate CSR and New Governance 
principles. Part B explains trends in environmental 
policymaking that mirror business reform, especially those that 
embody collaborative rather than adversarial approaches to 
environmental protection. This section then considers NRDA 
and ultimately integrates the policy of cooperative NRDA with 
New Governance principles, highlighting trends toward 
collaboration among stakeholders. 
A. Business Reform and New Governance 
New Governance has emerged in response to CSR’s 
inadequacies in incentivizing ethical corporate behavior. 
Scholars often focus on the CSR movement and how its maxims 
may be incorporated into the business-decision-making 
process.16 CSR advocates encourage corporations to broaden 
  
 14 Edwin M. Epstein, The Good Company: Rhetoric or Reality? Corporate 
Social Responsibility and Business Ethics Redux, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 207, 212-16 (2007) 
(arguing that CSR is inherently insufficient in achieving the Good Company). Epstein 
provides his own framework and describes corporations, by virtue of their economic and 
political power, as the most efficient proxies through which his framework can 
encourage the actualization of the Good Company. Id. at 210-12.  
 15 See generally Amiram Gill, Corporate Governance as Social Responsibility: 
A Research Agenda, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 452, 465 (2008). 
 16 Id. at 463-66; see also George Cheney, Juliet Roper & Steve May, Overview, 
in THE DEBATE OVER CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 3, 4 (Steve May, George 
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relationships with multiple stakeholders, engage in meaningful 
and sustained efforts to improve communities,17 and conform to 
society’s laws and ethical customs.18 Increasingly, however, 
scholars recognize that the CSR movement’s goals are 
fundamentally flawed. Though some argue that corporations 
ought to do good for goodness’s sake,19 several view such duties, 
if not tethered to the corporate bottom line, as hopelessly 
naïve.20 Moreover, critics argue that corporate marketing 
  
Cheney & Juliet Roper eds., 2007) (explaining that conversations about unchecked 
corporate power are central to conversations about how to “probe in an informed and 
systematic way the potentials for positive social change in, through, and around the 
modern corporation”); John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and 
Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 
J. CORP. L. 1, 37-38 (2005) (describing CSR as “a complex communication network 
among public and private actors,” which, “[a]t its best, promises a corporate decision 
making process in which managers think and talk openly about social and 
environmental issues and then tell the world what they did and why”). 
 17 Cheney, Roper & May, supra note 16, at 3. 
 18 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, (Magazine), Sept. 13, 1970, at 33, reprinted in BUSINESS ETHICS 17 
(Tamara L. Roleff ed., 1996) (describing the responsibility of the corporate executive). 
Friedman argues that this responsibility “is to conduct business in accordance with 
[the shareholder’s] desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible 
while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those 
embodied in ethical custom.” Id. While Friedman articulates this point as a response to 
the CSR movement, he fails to consider how ethical custom and the law interact. 
Indeed, he fails to consider that ethical custom and the law are, in fact, 
interdependent. See Cyrus Mehri, Andrea Giampetro-Meyer & Michael B. Runnels, 
One Nation, Indivisible: The Use of Diversity Report Cards to Promote Transparency, 
Accountability and Workplace Fairness, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 395, 407 (2004). 
 19 See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and 
the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 581 (2009) (characterizing the 
philosophical underpinnings of the CSR movement as based on the view that 
corporations have a moral duty to do good for others, even at the expense of the bottom 
line); see also David P. Baron, The Positive Theory of Moral Management, Social 
Pressure, and Corporate Social Performance 5 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance, 
Working Paper No. 36, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913808 (arguing 
that one of the principles underlying the CSR movement is that corporations have an 
abstract “moral duty” to do good). 
 20 See Elizabeth F. Brown, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Is There a Need 
for a Safe Harbor for Aspirational Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 367, 399 (2008) (explaining the reason why certain corporations do not engage in 
CSR). Brown argues corporate reluctance is partly due to the fact that following CSR 
principles is more expensive than not, and corporations cannot always pass the costs to 
the consumer. Id. Moreover, Brown argues that “[p]art of those added costs are the 
costs associated with increased risk of litigation that corporations adopting codes that 
embody CSR principles face.” Id.; see also Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism 
Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate Social Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP. 
L. REV. 831, 839 (2008) (characterizing CSR as profit-centric). Kerr explains that since 
the effects of CSR on the bottom line have become quantifiable, the law supports, if not 
requires, corporate managers to “investigate and consider whether CSR can impact the 
bottom line.” Id. Kerr further argues that a corporate manager who does not consider 
such linkages—who does not weigh profits as a consideration—could be considered 
derelict in her duty. Id. 
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strategists have effectively co-opted the CSR movement as a 
tool to preserve branding and public image.21  
Principles of New Governance can incentivize the 
responsible behavior society expects. There is no single model 
of New Governance; rather, several evolving models have been 
developed and tried in various industries around the globe.22 
The underlying premise of New Governance is that corporate-
governance mechanisms, if they are to be responsive to public 
expectations of responsible corporate behavior, must have 
greater flexibilities. Furthermore, those flexibilities ought to be 
animated by outcomes—not processes.23  
New Governance promotes systems that “use 
innovative, pragmatic, information-based, iterative, and 
dialogic mechanisms to gather, distill, and leverage industry 
learning in the service of a still-robust but better designed—
that is, more effective and less burdensome—public regulatory 
mandate.”24 In every respect, deliberation among stakeholder 
  
 21 See, e.g., S. PRAKASH SETHI, SETTING GLOBAL STANDARDS: GUIDELINES FOR 
CREATING CODES OF CONDUCT IN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 45-63 (2003) 
(regarding the marketing benefits from CSR and the widespread practice of insufficient 
or inconsistent implementation); Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Putting the S Back in 
Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multilevel Theory of Social Change in Organizations, 32 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836, 838 (2007) (arguing that “some companies introduce CSR practices 
at a superficial level for window-dressing purposes”); Joe W. (Chip) Pitts, III, Corporate 
Social Responsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
334, 373-82 (2009) (finding credible the critiques that consider “CSR as, at best, toothless 
and marketing-oriented, and at worst a malevolent strategy to co-opt or render powerless 
the critical forces hoping to tame corporations with the more meaningful constraints of 
law”); Betsy Atkins, Is Corporate Social Responsibility Responsible?, FORBES (Nov. 28, 2006, 
12:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/corporatecitizenship/2006/11/16/leadership-philanthropy-
charity-lead-citizen-cx_ba_1128directorship.html (detailing the disingenuousness of 
corporate CSR campaigns). Atkins writes that “[t]here are practical reasons why 
corporations should cloak themselves in the politically correct rhetoric of social 
responsibility. But marketing should not be confused with significant deployments of 
corporate assets.” Id.; see also Gill, supra note 15, at 462 (arguing that “CSR has 
become a business-sensitive, if not business-driven practice”). Gill notes that many 
critics consider the CSR’s original motive to have been effectively subordinated to 
corporate marketing strategies. Id. 
 22 See New Governance, supra note 13. 
 23 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. See generally Epstein, supra note 14.  
 24 See Ford, supra note 13, at 5 (describing the B.C. (British Columbia, 
Canada) model as an example of the New Governance). Ford defines the linchpin of 
this model as a “substantially [altered] relationship between regulators and 
industry”—a relationship not defined by inflexible regulators mandating rules that are 
often incompatible with fast-paced business environments, but a relationship defined 
by a shared responsibility and a pragmatic responsiveness to “complex real-life social 
systems.” Id. at 27. Ford goes on to describe this New Governance as the “most 
effective mechanism for making decisions in complex organizational structures.” Id. at 
27-28. This, Ford argues, is an “opportunity for dialogic and transparent securities 
regulation,” viewed from the perspective of industry, regulators, shareholders, 
stakeholders, and CSR advocates. Id. at 27-28, 60. 
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groups is central to New Governance approaches.25 Rather than 
emphasize checklist-style compliance with prescriptive legal 
rules—which often incentivizes corporate actors to discover and 
abuse loopholes26—New Governance principles encourage 
groups to orient themselves in the underlying policy priorities 
of those rules. In turn, New Governance approaches 
continually revise both means and ends to solve problems as 
they arise.27 New Governance approaches also strive to foster 
transparency and accountability; envision corporate decision 
making as a collaborative, rather than an adversarial, process; 
and “provide[] a rational, systemic alternative to draconian 
rule-making and [its] often adverse effects on business.”28  
Statute and policy reform (in the environmental arena 
and elsewhere) have emerged as a result of New Governance 
principles. For example, British Columbia’s Bill 38 offers a 
principle-based and outcome-oriented approach to securities 
regulation.29 One part of Bill 38 replaces detailed, compliance-
based rules governing dealers and advisors with rules arranged 
under broader standards.30 These broader standards motivate 
dealers and advisors to exercise sound judgment, whereas the 
compliance approach motivated mere adherence to rules that 
might have been misconstrued.31  
Political scientists Christopher McGrory Klyza and 
David Sousa, in their review of American environmental policy, 
recounted two further examples of collaborative approaches in 
environmental protection.32 Quincy Library Group in Northern 
California brought a variety of participants together—local 
politicians, environmentalists, and members of the timber 
industry—to create a logging plan that better supports the 
  
 25 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 26 See Ford, supra note 13, at 29 (arguing that while corporations strictly 
adhering to the letter of the law may appear ideal, such strict adherence, paradoxically, 
may generate the very moral hazards that undermine corporate governance objectives—
through incentivizing the corporate discovery and abuse of regulatory loopholes). 
 27 Id. at 29-30. 
 28 Michael B. Runnels, Elizabeth J. Kennedy & Timothy B. Brown, Corporate 
Social Responsibility and the New Governance: In Search of Epstein’s Good Company in 
the Employment Context, 43 AKRON L. REV. 501, 534 (2010).  
 29 Ford, supra note 13. British Columbia passed Bill 38, and is currently 
implementing principles-based securities regulation. History of the 2004 BC Securities 
Legislation, BRIT. COLUM. SEC. COMMISSION, http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/instruments.aspx?id= 
1894 (last visited Aug. 21, 2011). 
 30 Ford, supra note 13, at 17-18. 
 31 Id. at 19. 
 32 CHRISTOPHER MCGRORY KLYZA & DAVID SOUSA, AMERICAN 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, 1990-2006: BEYOND GRIDLOCK 244 (2008). 
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environment.33 Another group of ranchers and environmentalists, 
the Quivara Coalition, collaborated on an environmentally 
conscious cattle-ranching plan.34 These examples illustrate 
mechanisms that deemphasize draconian-rule making, which 
often typifies inflexible regulation. Instead, these examples 
emphasize cooperation among business, government, and 
additional stakeholder groups as a means to improve decision 
making. These examples are typical of the New Governance 
movement.35 
In one application of New Governance theory, Epstein 
considered factors that induce corporations to become “Good 
Companies”—companies that act as ethical corporate citizens.36 
In particular, Epstein found, six “modes of social control”37 
encourage corporations to engage in socially responsible 
behavior—law, affinity group regulation, self-regulation, ethical 
precepts, the media, and an engaged civil society.38 Epstein’s 
model provides a practical framework with which scholars can 
systematically develop—and redevelop—methods to galvanize 
positive corporate behavior.  
In brief, Epstein defined the modes of social control as 
follows: Law is the articulation of public policy enforced by 
government.39 Affinity group regulation refers to standards of 
behavior established by members of a particular profession, 
  
 33 Id. at 233-36. 
 34 Id. at 236-40. 
 35 While New Governance taxonomies are often contested, a core element in 
virtually all the theory’s formulations is that private-public associations and networks 
animated by a series of new regulatory frameworks may achieve social and public good. 
See generally Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-
Regulatory State, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY 
REFORMS FOR THE AGE OF GOVERNANCE 145 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds., 
2004) (exploring theoretical approaches to regulation and providing a foundation for 
New Governance scholarship); see also Ford, supra note 13, at 28 (conceptualizing a 
New Governance framework for securities regulation, Ford explains that it would 
entail a regulatory structure that “spans the so-called public/private divide, pulls 
industry experience into regulatory decision making, and establishes robust ongoing 
communication mechanisms (rather than an information-hoarding, adversarial 
relationship) between industry and regulator”). 
 36 See Epstein, supra note 14, at 210-13 (arguing that the modern corporate 
social responsibility movement is inherently insufficient in encouraging ethical 
corporate behavior, Epstein provides his own framework as the means by which one 
can incentivize the actualization of the Good Company). 
 37 Id. at 210-12. 
 38 Id. at 212-16 (arguing that CSR is inherently insufficient in achieving the 
Good Company). Epstein provides his own framework and describes corporations, by 
virtue of their economic and political power, as the most efficient proxies through 
which his framework can encourage the actualization of the Good Company. Id. 
 39 Id. at 210. 
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such as medicine.40 Self-regulation is the voluntary adherence 
to issue-specific standards (such as standards concerning 
climate change) set by nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs).41 Companies that self-regulate are expected to comply 
with standards voluntarily and in good faith.42 Ethical precepts 
are beliefs “derive[d] from religion, humanistic philosophy, 
social customs, mores, and traditions.”43 Ethics often inform or 
inspire laws.44 Vigilant and responsible media respond to 
corporate malfeasance by reporting material that renders 
corporate behavior transparent.45 Finally, an engaged civil 
society refers to direct-citizen action through the leveling of 
pressure on government officials.46  
While law has traditionally served as the centerpiece to 
control corporate behavior, legal and CSR scholars increasingly 
recognize that corporate malfeasance is highly context-specific. 
For example, in a given situation some modes may work better 
than others to encourage socially beneficial corporate 
behavior.47 Epstein’s model will be applied below in Part III.  
B. Environmental Policymaking, NRDA, and Cooperative 
NRDA 
The rise of New Governance in business brought with it 
an attempt to create new cooperative approaches to 
environmental regulation. Legal scholars have noted that the 
shift from command-and-control approaches was concomitant 
with business reform’s shift to New Governance.48 Regulators 
  
 40 Id. at 210-11. 
 41 Id. at 211. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id.  
 44 Id. at 211-12. 
 45 Id. at 212. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See generally Runnels, Kennedy & Brown, supra note 28. Epstein lists his 
modes of social control in descending order of importance: law, affinity group 
regulation, self-regulation, ethical precepts, the media, and an engaged civil society. 
Epstein, supra note 14, at 210. In addition to arguing that the modes be used in a 
prescribed order of importance, he also contends that each mode must be used to 
galvanize ethical corporate behavior. Id. at 212. Runnels, Kennedy, and Brown 
discount Epstein’s argument that his modes must be both considered in a precise order 
and in concert. They suggest instead that context matters in terms of which, and how, 
the modes are applied. Runnels, Kennedy & Brown, supra note 28, at 513. 
 48 Lisa Blomgren Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law: 
Building the Legal Infrastructure for Collaborative Governance, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 297, 
300. Blomgren Bingham describes developments in statutory administrative law. She 
indicates that “[c]ollaborative governance represents an emerging alternative to 
traditional command-and-control approaches to making, implementing, and enforcing 
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that utilize command-and-control approaches command 
particular environmental goals and issue instructions, or 
controls, detailing how to reach those goals.49 Collaborative 
approaches, however, bring stakeholders together to share 
information and seek solutions that support a both-and agenda.50 
Similar to a “win-win” situation, a both-and agenda seeks to both 
achieve environmental goals and factor in economic concerns.51 
Today, a range of environmental policy areas endorse problem 
solving that is consistent with the both-and policy—collaborative, 
voluntary, and transparent (e.g., collaborative watershed 
management52 and collaborative energy management).53 
CERCLA and OPA, however, rest on the outdated 
approaches of yesteryear. Congress passed CERCLA in 1980 at 
the end of the Environmental Era—the golden era of 
environmental lawmaking, from 1964 to 1980.54 Congress passed 
OPA in 199055 as the shift from command-and-control to 
collaborative approaches was beginning.56 Not surprisingly, the 
  
policy.” Id. She also notes that collaborative governance relates to new governance, 
“which includes the use of policy tools that involve privatization of previously public 
work and devolution of responsibility from unitary bureaucracies to networks and 
contracts.” Id.  
 49 Command and control rules impose detailed limits on industrial operations 
with the goal of controlling companies that pollute. Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing 
Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 104 (1998). Command-and-control approaches mandate 
behavior, are generally inflexible, and specify “compliancy strategies for achieving a 
rigidly defined environmental benchmark.” Laurie A. Wayburn & Anton A. Chiono, The 
Role of Federal Policy in Establishing Ecosystem Service Markets, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL’Y F. 385, 403-04 (2010). 
 50 Highlights of the Collaboration Era are: “(1) the replacement of traditional 
consultative agency practices with much more collaborative and consensus-based 
approaches, (2) the large range of governmental and nongovernmental actors involved, 
and (3) the recognition that decision making should not be left to bureaucratic experts.” 
PAUL A. SABATIER ET AL., SWIMMING UPSTREAM: COLLABORATIVE APPROACHES TO 
WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 50-51 (2005). Decision-making processes should reflect 
scientific and local knowledge. Additionally, processes should be responsive to a range 
of stakeholders. See id. 
 51 KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 32, at 5. Creative problem-solving can take 
away the notion of either-or—that a group can respond to either environmental 
concerns or economic concerns, not both.  
 52 SABATIER ET AL., supra note 50. 
 53 For example, the U.S. Energy Star program, a government-backed 
program that helps businesses and individuals protect the environment through 
superior energy efficiency, relies on collaboration with stakeholder groups, especially 
industry. About ENERGY STAR, ENERGY STAR, http://www.energystar.gov/ 
index.cfm?c=about.ab_index (last visited Aug. 21, 2011). 
 54 KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 32, at 1. 
 55 Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2006). 
 56 KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 32, at 3. 
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NRDA processes outlined in both statutes and their accompanying 
regulations exemplify the command-and-control approach.57  
Recall that CERCLA outlines legal requirements for 
cleanup and restoration after releases of hazardous substances at 
waste sites,58 while OPA outlines legal requirements for cleanup 
and restoration after oil spills.59 Both CERCLA and OPA define 
natural resources broadly—fish, wildlife, drinking water supplies, 
land, and other such resources that the United States somehow 
controls (e.g., property it manages or holds in trust).60 Though 
CERCLA and OPA tailor responses to different environmental 
needs, the NRDA processes under both statutes are similar. 
In NRDA, state and federal natural-resource agencies, 
such as the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), serve as 
Trustees. During restoration, the RP replaces the resources or 
acquires equivalent resources. Additionally, RPs may 
compensate the public for the interim loss of natural resources 
contaminated by the incident. Trustees achieve natural-
resource restoration by negotiating with RPs or forcing RPs to 
act through litigation.61 Scientists, engineers, economists, and 
  
 57 Although OPA includes the word cooperative, RPs and Trustees still 
assume an adversarial relationship in practice under OPA’s NRDA process. See infra 
notes 218-22 and accompanying text. 
 58 CERCLA was enacted in response to the Love Canal disaster. Basic 
Information: What Is Superfund?, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ 
superfund/about.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). For an article exploring aspects of the 
complicated CERCLA process, which are beyond the scope of this article, see Jason J. 
Czarnezki & Adrianne K. Zahner, The Utility of Non-Use Values in Natural Resource 
Damage Assessments, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509 (2005). Czarnezki and Zahner urge 
CERCLA trustees to advance public interest by engaging in proper valuation of natural 
resource damages. In particular, they urge trustees to include “non-use” values in NRDA. 
Id. at 512. Non-use value includes “the simple knowledge that something exists . . . , the 
potential for its use . . . , or the expectation that it will be of use to future generations.” Id. 
at 511. These attributes are existence, option, and bequest value. Id. 
 59 OPA was enacted in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Oil Pollution 
Act Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/osweroe1/content/ 
lawsregs/opaover.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). For an interesting article that 
explores the complex, uncertain NRDA process that followed the Valdez spill, see 
Sanne Knudsen, A Precautionary Tale: Assessing Ecological Damages After the Exxon 
Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 95 (2009). 
 60 Both CERCLA and OPA define “natural resources” broadly to include “land, 
fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such 
resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (2006); 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20) (2006). See generally Natural 
Resource Damages: A Primer, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ 
superfund/programs/nrd/primer.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2011) [hereinafter NRD Primer]. 
 61 Conner & Gouguet, supra note 11, at 20. 
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regulatory specialists join Trustees and RPs as they follow the 
DOI and NOAA methodologies of NRDA.62  
The CERCLA NRDA Process includes four phases: (1) 
preassessment screening, (2) assessment planning, (3) 
assessment implementation, and (4) postassessment.63 During 
preassessment, Trustees determine whether natural resources 
have been injured.64 In the second stage, the assessment plan, 
Trustees confirm that pollutants have affected trust resources. 
They then develop an assessment plan that outlines the 
procedures Trustees will use to assess damages.65 During 
assessment implementation, Trustees gather data to quantify 
injuries and determine damages.66 Scientists conduct field and 
laboratory studies to evaluate injuries to natural resources.67 
Trustees then compare information from injury investigations 
to baseline conditions in order to develop resource or service 
loss estimates.68 The final phase, postassessment, identifies 
restoration options and establishes monitoring protocols to 
ensure the success of the selected restoration projects.69  
The OPA NRDA Process includes three phases: (1) 
preliminary assessment, (2) injury assessment, and (3) 
restoration implementation.70 During preliminary assessment, 
Trustees determine the impacts of pollutants on natural 
resources.71 Scientists collect time-sensitive data and review 
scientific literature to determine how a particular hazardous 
substance has affected trust resources.72 If Trustees determine 
that resources are injured, they proceed to the second phase.73 
  
 62 NRD Primer, supra note 59 (outlining the details of NRD assessments 
under both CERCLA and OPA). The Primer outlines the DOI’s methodologies with 
regard to NRD under CERCLA. It also outlines the NRDA methodologies under OPA. 
 63 Natural Resource Damage Assessment, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/nrd/nrda2.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 15 C.F.R. §§ 990.40-60 (2010); see also Damage Assessment: How Natural 
Resource Damage Assessment Works, NOAA: GULF SPILL RESTORATION: DAMAGE 
ASSESSMENT, REMEDIATION & RESTORATION PROGRAM, http://www.gulfspillrestoration. 
noaa.gov/assessment/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2011). 
 71 15 C.F.R. § 990.42. 
 72 Mathematical models designed to help predict the fate and effects of the spill 
on trust resources may also be used. Pre-Assessment: Phase One: Studying the Impacts, 
NOAA: GULF SPILL RESTORATION: DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, REMEDIATION & RESTORATION 
PROGRAM, http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/assessment/pre-assessment/ (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2011). 
 73 Id. 
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In this phase, injury assessment, Trustees quantify the scope of 
the injuries and “identify possible restoration projects.”74 
Trustees rely on both economic and scientific studies to assess 
the injuries to natural resources and the impact on the public 
use of those resources.75 Additionally, Trustees use these 
studies to develop a restoration plan that details ways to work 
toward quick recovery of the injured resources and payment to 
parties who suffered losses due to natural resource injuries.76 
Trustees then evaluate the restoration options and ask the 
public to comment on a draft of the restoration plan.77  
The Trustees move on to the final phase of OPA’s NRDA 
process once the injury assessment is complete.78 In this phase, 
restoration, the restoration plan is implemented while NOAA 
and other Trustees monitor its effectiveness.79 The Trustees 
first identify the full spectrum of injuries and determine the 
optimal restoration procedures.80 The Trustees, working in 
tandem with the public, then select and implement the 
restoration projects.81 The costs of assessment and restoration 
are borne by the RPs, who work cooperatively with the 
Trustees.82 If the RPs refuse to bear these costs, the Trustees 
may file a lawsuit or submit a claim of damages to the Oil Spill 
Liability Trust Fund.83 The United States may then seek to 
recover the costs paid out by the fund from the RPs.84 The 
restoration that Trustees implement may fall into any or all of 
the following categories: emergency restoration,85 primary 
restoration,86 compensatory restoration,87 or early restoration.88 
  
 74 Injury Assessment: Phase Two: Focusing on Injuries, NOAA: GULF SPILL 
RESTORATION: DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, REMEDIATION & RESTORATION PROGRAM, 
http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/assessment/injury-assessment/ (last visited 
Feb. 23, 2011). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Restoration: Final Phase: Restoring Resources, NOAA: GULF SPILL 
RESTORATION: DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, REMEDIATION & RESTORATION PROGRAM, 
http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/assessment/restoration/ (last visited Feb. 23, 
2011) [hereinafter Restoration: Final Phase]. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. 
 83 For additional information, see The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, NAT’L 
POLLUTION FUNDS CENTER: FUNDING TODAY FOR A CLEANER TOMORROW, 
http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/About_NPFC/osltf.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2011). 
 84 See infra note 88. 
 85 Restoration: Final Phase, supra note 79. NOAA defines “emergency 
restoration” to include “actions that are taken by the trustees prior to the completion of 
the damage assessment and restoration planning process to prevent or reduce 
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NRDA can be both time-consuming and expensive.89 And 
despite the seemingly collaborative nature of the process, in the 
end, RPs and Trustees are poised to litigate, not negotiate. 
Cooperative NRDA processes, however—where Trustees and 
RPs voluntarily work together to resolve natural resource 
liability90—reduce costs and increase restoration’s efficiency. In 
cooperative NRDA, Trustees and RPs engage in strategic 
collaboration to generate accurate information and share that 
information with an eye toward restoration.91  
Michael Ammann, a Staff Environmental Scientist at 
ChevronTexaco Energy Technology Company, explained that 
cooperative NRDA is more likely when Trustees and RPs 
develop a commonly held vision of what a successful 
restoration project would look like.92 Ammann described an 
example of a specific pollution incident, an oil spill that 
occurred in Bay Point, California, when a Chevron pipeline 
ruptured.93 Ammann indicated that, when NRDA for the oil 
spill began, a representative of California’s Department of Fish 
and Game’s Office of Spill Prevention and Response suggested 
a specific restoration project the parties could use.94 This 
representative’s suggestion laid the foundation for what 
  
continuing natural resource impacts and prevent potential irreversible loss of natural 
resources.” Id. 
 86 Id. NOAA defines “primary restoration” as those actions that “return[] the 
impacted resources to the condition that would have existed if the incident had not 
occurred.” Id. 
 87 Id. NOAA defines “compensatory restoration” as those actions that address 
the “losses from the date of injury until recovery is completed.” Id. 
 88 Id. NOAA describes “early restoration” as “a form of compensatory 
restoration, [which] can be implemented prior to the completion of the NRDA process, 
when opportunities arise, to achieve restoration faster.” Id. 
 89 Conner & Gouguet, supra note 11, at 20. The parties share a “commitment 
to identifying a fair and appropriate amount of restoration for the oil spill or waste site 
under consideration.” Id. at 24. NRD includes the reasonable costs of a damage 
assessment. In practice, this means RPs or PRPs (Potentially Responsible Parties) 
engaged in a NRDA are liable for the Trustees’ assessment costs as well as the natural 
resource restoration costs. Id. at 20. The damage assessment can take five years or 
more. If the case ends in litigation, the process could take five to ten additional years. 
Moreover, parties (Trustees and RPs) are sometimes reluctant to share data. 
“[L]itigation quality” NRDA is especially expensive, and RPs end up paying for it. Id. 
 90 Id. at 24. 
 91 Id. at 24-25. Conner and Gouguet indicate that the following would be 
indicative of cooperative NRDA: parties would share information, guide the NRDA 
process with the best scientific research, involve the principals, conduct an open 
process, and deal effectively with disagreement. Id. at 26. 
 92 Michael Ammann, Shared Vision. Sounds Obvious. Can We Make It 
Happen?, ENVTL. F., May-June 2004, at 21. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. The Trustee was a representative of the California Department of Fish 
and Game’s Office of Spill Prevention and Response. Id.  
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successful restoration would look like; the RP and Trustees 
would work towards a common goal.95 Moving forward with the 
shared vision, the RP (Chevron) and Trustees voluntarily 
reached agreements regarding injuries and how to respond to 
future risks.96 The parties settled the NRDA in three meetings97: 
“By focusing on restoration, managing uncertainty, and 
avoiding unnecessary studies, restoration was achieved faster 
and all parties realized savings in transactions costs, especially 
consultant and legal fees.”98 
From the opposing perspective of a community 
organization, Mark Davis, Executive Director of the Coalition 
to Restore Coastal Louisiana in Baton Rouge, recounted a story 
of public and private actors who worked together to protect and 
restore Bayou Trepagnier.99 The process involved a coalition of 
stakeholders, including Shell Oil Company (the RP), state 
Trustees (including the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality, or DEQ) and federal Trustees (the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or NOAA). 
The parties worked with the Coalition to Restore Coastal 
Louisiana (which represented local interests) to resolve 
complex, contentious issues.100 In evaluating the NRDA process, 
Davis wrote, “[W]hat NRDA did was provide a forum and 
enough compulsion to begin to work issues through.”101 The 
parties reached a settlement, and Davis highlighted the 
importance of community groups in bringing about the 
cooperative process.102 
  
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. Cooperative NRDA can be highly technical. It includes these two 
features: (1) restoration-based assessments, and (2) integration of NRDA processes and 
cleanup. Conner & Gouguet, supra note 11, at 22. Restoration-based assessments allow 
Trustees and RPs to focus on “restoration of the injured resources rather than on 
valuation of the lost resources and services.” Id. The focus is on “getting to restoration,” 
and seeking “the cost of carrying out the restoration as the measure of damages rather 
than the value of the injured resources and lost services.” Id. Similarly, “prospective 
restoration” refers to processes that consider restoration at the beginning of an NRDA 
claim. Prospective restoration allows for some natural resources to be restored, 
providing ecological services and saving costs, while the formal NRDA process unfolds 
over the course of several years. Stephen K. Davis, Lawrence D. Malizzi & Nel Yoskin, 
How Prospective Restoration and Planning Can Be Use in the Settlement of Dredging 
Natural Resource Damage Cases (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors). 
 99 Mark Davis, Community Organizations Can Make the Process Work, 
ENVTL. F., May-June 2004, at 25. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id. 
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As these examples illustrate, cooperative NRDA 
provides the collaborative, consensus-based approach that 
promises to work more effectively than command-and-control 
approaches. Unfortunately, the cooperative NRDA examples 
this section has described remain the ideal. The next two cases 
illustrate adversarial NRDA—the reality. 
II. GE, BP, AND NRDA PROCESSES UNDER CERCLA AND 
OPA 
A. GE, PCBs, and the Hudson River 
In 1942, GE began using polychlorinated biphenyls, or 
PCBs, in its capacitators.103 As part of the manufacturing 
process for electrical transformers and capacitors,104 GE 
discharged PCBs into the Hudson River,105 among other 
locations.106 In 1977, the EPA banned the direct discharge of 
PCBs into U.S. waters.107 At that time, the synthetic compounds 
were described as a “highly toxic . . . chemical”108 that resists 
biological degradation and is, consequently, “one of the most 
serious of the . . . environmental contamination problems 
prevalent today.”109 The Environmental Defense Fund, a 
Washington-based environmental law firm, led the actions that 
challenged PCB discharges and asked the EPA to rule on the 
proposed ban.110 
  
 103 See FRANCES F. DUNWELL, THE HUDSON: AMERICA’S RIVER 301 (2008); see also 
AUSTL. & N.Z. ENV’T & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, IDENTIFICATION OF PCB-CONTAINING 
CAPACITORS (1997), available at http://www.environment.gov.au/settlements/publications/ 
chemicals/scheduled-waste/pubs/pcbid.pdf. 
 104 Bayard Webster, E.P.A. Bans Discharge of PCB’s Directly into the Nation’s 
Waters, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1977, at 22. Monsanto Industrial Chemicals Company 
was, as of 1977, the only American maker of PCBs. PCBs were also used in metal 
casting plants and in the recycling of wastepaper. Id. 
 105 Id. 
 106 GE “is a responsible party in 52 active Superfund sites across the country.” 
Andrew C. Revkin, Dredging of Pollutants Begins in Hudson, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2009, 
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/16/science/earth/16dredge.html? 
pagewanted=all. 
 107 Webster, supra note 104. 
 108 Id. PCBs were identified as “a close relative of DDT,” which had already 
been “found in scientific studies to cause deformities in fetuses, changes in liver 
function, nervous disorders, and cancer in animals.” Id. 
 109 Id. In 1970, during hearings about Con Edison’s proposed hydroelectric 
project in Cornwall, New York—Storm King Mountain—a leading federal marine 
biologist, John R. Clark, first raised concerns about PCBs in the Hudson. See 
DUNWELL, supra note 103, at 301. 
 110 See DUNWELL, supra note 103, at 301. The same firm had also led the 
actions that yielded the DDT ban in 1972. Webster, supra note 104, at 22. 
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By the time the EPA banned the discharge of PCBs into 
U.S. waters, GE had already released approximately 1.3 million 
pounds of PCBs into the Hudson.111 In 1976, commercial fishing 
in the Hudson River was banned due to the PCB releases.112 
Scientists determined that Hudson River fish ingested much 
more than the permissible level of the chemical to be safe for 
human consumption.113 In particular, scientists believed that 
consuming fish from the upper Hudson could increase the risk of 
cancer.114 GE negotiated a settlement with the State Department 
of Environmental Conservation wherein GE agreed to cease 
PCB dumping, pay $3 million toward cleansing the river, and 
provide $1 million for PCB research.115 This settlement was 
significant because, after it, New York citizens no longer had 
recourse against GE under state law. 
In 1980, Congress passed CERCLA, which required GE 
to clean or neutralize PCBs in the river.116 In the early 1980s, 
talk of dredging the river bottom began.117 GE relied on scientists 
and lawyers to create and implement strategies to avoid 
dredging.118 GE accused the EPA of “shoddy science” and argued 
that tightening the spigot at or near the polluting plants was 
sufficient for restoration.119 GE maintained that sediments from 
the past were stagnant and no cause for concern.120 By this point, 
an environmental group, Scenic Hudson, emerged as the 
primary advocate for the public regarding the natural resources 
in and around the Hudson River.121 
The EPA issued a report detailing the status of the 
Hudson in 1997. Although GE had managed to stop new PCB 
leaks, heavy concentrations of PCBs remained at the bottom of 
Thompson Island Pool, a six-mile stretch of river downstream 
from GE’s plants in Ford Edward and Hudson Falls.122 But more 
  
 111 Revkin, supra note 106. 
 112 DUNWELL, supra note 103, at 312. 
 113 SHELDON KAMIENIECKI, CORPORATE AMERICA AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY: HOW OFTEN DOES BUSINESS GET ITS WAY? 144 (2006). 
 114 Id.; see also Editorial, The PCB War Heats Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1997, 
§ 4, at 14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/02/opinion/the-pcb-war-heats-
up.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2011) [hereinafter PCB War]. 
 115 DUNWELL, supra note 103, at 312. 
 116 Id. 
 117 KAMIENIECKI, supra note 113, at 144. 
 118 Id. at 145. 
 119 PCB War, supra note 114. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
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importantly, PCBs had not biodegraded or detoxified.123 
Undegraded, PCBs that were buried for decades entered the food 
chain where they could biomagnify to toxic concentrations.124  
In 2000, after studying PCBs and health hazards, the 
EPA ordered GE to spend a half-billion dollars over five years 
to dredge toxic PCBs embedded in the river bottom north of 
Albany.125 In particular, the EPA determined that PCB levels in 
the upper Hudson’s fish were still unacceptably high.126 Carol 
Browner, the EPA administrator at the time, asserted, “This 
river needs to be cleaned up. It will not clean itself.”127 New 
York Governor George Pataki endorsed the strategy of forcing 
GE to dredge and pay for the dredging.128  
In protest, GE argued that “someone would have to eat 
a half-pound of fish a week for forty years to run even a remote 
cancer risk.”129 Moreover, GE issued a reminder of the state’s 
catch-and-release policy, which required fisherman to return 
caught fish to the water.130 The EPA and environmental groups 
responded simply that the river should be cleaned.131 GE then 
launched a public relations campaign to argue that dredging 
the river would “devastate the lives of upriver communities.”132 
From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, GE conducted a 
multimillion-dollar campaign aimed at both politicians and 
citizens, highlighting the dangers of removing PCBs from the 
river.133 GE also asserted that the dredging would “disrupt river 
life for a generation.”134  
The EPA issued a record of decision in 2002 that laid 
out a legally binding cleanup plan.135 The decision—devised 
  
 123 Id. 
 124 Editorial, Plausible Plan for the Hudson, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2000, at A38, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/08/opinion/plausible-plan-for-the-hudson.html 
[hereinafter Plausible Plan]. 
 125 DUNWELL, supra note 103, at 312. 
 126 Charlie Cray, Toxins on the Hudson: The Saga of GE, PCBs and the 
Hudson River, 22 MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, July/Aug. 2001, available at 
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2001/01july-august/julyaug01corp1.html. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Plausible Plan, supra note 124. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 See id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 KAMIENIECKI, supra note 113, at 145. 
 134 John M. Glionna, Dredging Up Ill Will on the Hudson, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2001, at 17, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2001/oct/01/news/mn-52036. 
 135 Editorial, Waiting for G.E., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, at 14WC, available at 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A01E0D71630F935A15750C0A9609C8B63 
[hereinafter Waiting]. 
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under the Clinton administration and ratified by President 
Bush’s EPA administrator, Christine Todd Whitman—was 
considered “a mix of politics and science.”136 In April 2002, after 
exhausting nearly all avenues to appeal the decision, GE 
changed its position and offered to clean the Hudson River.137  
In 2005, after years of denying responsibility, GE signed 
a consent decree committing itself to the removal of PCBs from 
the Hudson River.138 The plan called for dredging to begin in 
2007,139 but environmental groups wondered whether GE would 
continue “a timeworn pattern of grinding delay.”140 The decree 
called for two phases of cleanup and bound GE to just the first 
phase—a year-long, $100 million project to remove the thickest 
PCB deposits, 2.65 million yards of tainted mud.141 Phase Two—
a five-year, $500 million project—calls for the dredging of the 
remaining 90 percent of sediment.142 The second phase covers 
sediment spread over a much larger, though less heavily 
contaminated, area.143  
In 2006, GE submitted a detailed cleanup plan to the EPA 
and announced that the company could start dredging in 2008 at 
the earliest.144 On May 16, 2009, GE began the Phase One 
dredging.145 Mile-long freight trains carried the dredged sediment 
to a hazardous-waste landfill in Texas.146 The plan requires the 
company to replace the sediment with uncontaminated soil and 
native plants.147 In the meantime, GE continued to fight, this time 
challenging CERCLA’s constitutionality.148 
  
 136 Revkin, supra note 106. 
 137 DUNWELL, supra note 103, at 150. For an article arguing against dredging 
of the Hudson, see generally Erik Claudio, Comment, How the EPA May Be Selling 
General Electric Down the River: A Law and Economics Analysis of the $460 Million 
Hudson River Cleanup Plan, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 409 (2002) (arguing that, under 
a cost-benefit analysis, dredging is an improper solution to the Hudson River cleanup). 
 138 CMTY. ADVISORY GRP., HUDSON RIVER PCBS SUPERFUND SITE: SUMMARY OF 
CONSENT DECREE WITH GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (2005), available at 
http://www.hudsoncag.ene.com/files/CAG%20presentation.v2..pdf. 
 139 Editorial, A Commitment on PCB’s, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at 14WC, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/16/opinion/nyregionopinions/WE_EPA.html 
?pagewanted=print. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id.; see supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 144 Waiting, supra note 135. 
 145 Revkin, supra note 106. 
 146 Id.  
 147 Id. 
 148 In June 2010, GE lost this case in a federal appeals court. Brent Kendall, 
Appeals Court Rejects GE Challenge to Superfund Law, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704103904575336813411467390.html. 
2011] COOPERATIVE NRDA & NEW GOVERNANCE 127 
Like the cleanup process, the NRDA process is also 
underway. The Hudson River National Resource Trustees are 
the DOI, NOAA, and New York State Department of 
Environmental Conservation.149 The EPA coordinates with the 
Trustees per CERCLA requirements.150 
The Trustees released the Hudson River Preassessment 
Screen in October 1997151 and subsequently undertook injury 
assessment.152 They have planned or completed numerous 
studies, including wildlife injury, water- and air-quality injury, 
and pathway determination (e.g., floodplain evaluation).153 On 
September 16, 2002, the Trustees issued the assessment plan for 
the Hudson River. The plan identifies procedures that the 
Trustees must use to evaluate injuries to natural resources 
caused by PCBs.154 The Trustees are currently in the process of 
implementing the Assessment Plan.155 As part of this process, the 
Trustees continue to engage in studies on biological resources 
(such as fish, birds, amphibians, reptiles, and mammals) and 
other natural resources (such as surface water).156 During the 
implementation phase, the Trustees engage in ongoing 
monitoring of actions related to the Hudson cleanup. On May 7, 
  
 149 HUDSON RIVER NATURAL RES. TRS., RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY FOR THE 
HUDSON RIVER NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT PLAN (2003), available at 
http://www.darrp.noaa.gov/northeast/hudson/pdf/hrressum.pdf [hereinafter RESPONSIVENESS 
SUMMARY]. 
 150 42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2006). 
 151 Natural Resource Damage Assessment, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE: 
N.Y. FIELD OFFICE, http://www.fws.gov/northeast/nyfo/ec/nrda.htm (last updated May 
5, 2010) [hereinafter Natural Resource Damage Assessment: N.Y. Field Office]. 
 152 U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES UNDER CERCLA (1993), 
available at http://homer.ornl.gov/sesa/environment/guidance/cercla/nrda.pdf. 
 153 HUDSON RIVER NATURAL RES. TRS., HUDSON RIVER NATURAL RESOURCE 
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY OF THE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT PLAN (2002), available at 
http://www.fws.gov/contaminants/restorationplans/HudsonRiver/docs/HudsonRiverNRDA 
FactSheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2011) [hereinafter HUDSON RIVER NATURAL 
RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT].  
These preliminary investigations include an avian egg exposure investigation, 
floodplain soil and biota screening, an assessment of mink, muskrat and otter 
for PCB exposure, a snapping turtle egg exposure investigation and an 
assessment of contaminant levels in bullfrog and snapping turtle tissue, 
preliminary investigations of Eastern screech owl eggs and peregrine falcon 
eggs, and a preliminary investigation of frogs and sediments. 
Natural Resource Damage Assessment: N.Y. Field Office, supra note 151. 
 154 RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY, supra note 149, at 9. 
 155 See id. 
 156 HUDSON RIVER NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, supra note 153. 
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2010, for example, the Trustees offered support for the EPA’s 
decision to enforce dredging of the Hudson River.157  
B. BP, the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, and the Gulf of 
Mexico 
While BP brands itself “Beyond Petroleum,” an 
environmentally conscientious energy company, its reputation 
is now stained158 by the April 2010 explosion of its Deepwater 
Horizon drilling rig.159 The explosion, forty miles from the 
ecologically fragile Louisiana coast,160 killed eleven people and 
released millions of barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.161 
After the explosion, oil gushed from a cracked BP pipeline a 
mile beneath the ocean’s surface.162 At first, BP claimed 1000 
barrels of oil were released per day163 but later changed its 
estimate to 5000.164 BP maintained that the 5000-barrel figure 
was accurate165 even as outside scientists protested that BP 
deliberately low-balled the actual figure.166 Despite BP’s 
purported estimates, Congressperson Edward J. Markey, Chair 
of the House Energy and Environment Subcommittee, sought 
and secured the release of an internal BP document that 
revealed BP’s damage analysis and actual estimation—a worst-
  
 157 Press Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Hudson River Trustees Support 
EPA Stand on Dredging River (May 7, 2010), available at http://www.fws.gov/ 
news/newsreleases/showNews.cfm?newsId=74BE077C-EC03-0EB9-45BF36771CBE4CC0. 
 158 Krissah Thompson, BP’s Long Road to Regaining Consumer Confidence in Its 
Brand, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2010, at A2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/18/AR2010081803063.html; Clifford Krauss, Oil Spill’s Blow 
to BP’s Image May Eclipse Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2010, at B1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/business/30bp.html. 
 159 Campbell Robertson, Search Continues After Oil Rig Blast, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 22, 2010, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/us/22rig.html. 
 160 Clifford Krauss, Overhead and on the Ground, Waiting for a Potential 
Environmental Disaster to Hit, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2010, at A11, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/01/us/01spill.html (describing the coastal region of 
Louisiana, which includes the Mississippi River Delta, as ecologically sensitive and 
explaining the disaster that would result if the oil lands onshore). 
 161 Frank James, Deepwater Horizon’s 11 Dead Remembered, TWO-WAY: 
NPR’S NEWS BLOG, (May 25, 2010, 9:57 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2010/05/deepwater_horizon_11_dead_reme.html. 
 162 Tom Eley, One Year Since the BP Oil Spill: Covering Up a Catastrophe, 
WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/ 
apr2011/bps1-a20.shtml. 
 163 Justin Gillis, Size of Oil Spill Underestimated, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 14, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/us/14oil.html. 
 164 Eley, supra note 162. 
 165 Id.  
 166 Id. 
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case scenario of 100,000 barrels per day.167 Ultimately, the 
government declared the flow rate to be 62,000 barrels a day.168 
To date, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, beyond question, is 
the worst oil spill in U.S. history.169 
Soon after the rig explosion, BP executives faced harsh 
questioning from Congress regarding the foreseeability of the 
disaster.170 “The leaders of the House Committee on Energy and 
Commerce cited five areas in which the company had made 
decisions that increased the danger of a catastrophic well”171: 
the well’s design,172 improper maintenance of the blowout 
preventer,173 inadequate preparation and testing of the well 
casing’s cement job,174 misleading assurances that the well was 
properly sealed,175 and the lackadaisical preparation of a 
government-mandated oil-spill-response plan.176 
President Obama appointed a commission to explore the 
causes of the BP oil spill. The commission confirmed the 
findings of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce—
  
 167 Andrew C. Revkin, Early BP Worst Case on Flow: ‘100,000 Barrels Per Day,’ 
N.Y. TIMES DOT EARTH BLOG (June 20, 2010, 12:57 PM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2010/06/20/early-bp-worst-case-on-flow-100000-barrels-per-day/ (noting the striking 
difference between BP’s public statements and internal assessments regarding the 
estimated flow of oil). 
 168 Joel Achenbach & David A. Fahrenthold, Oil Spill Dumped 4.9 Million Barrels 
into Gulf of Mexico, Latest Measure Shows, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/02/AR2010080204695.html 
(addressing the governments revision of earlier spill estimates). 
 169 Bob Herbert, An Unnatural Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2010, at A25, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/29/opinion/29herbert.html. 
 170 Dan Barry, Looking for Answers, Finding One, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2010, 
at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/18/us/18land.html (describing the 
impassioned questioning of former BP CEO Tony Hayward by Congressional 
Representatives). 
 171 Henry Fountain, Documents Show Risky Decisions Before BP Blowout, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 14, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/science/earth/15rig.html 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 The categorization of walruses as “sensitive biological resources” in need of 
protection in the Gulf of Mexico is illustrative of this lackadaisical preparation: 
walruses have not existed in the Gulf for over three million years. See Andrew C. 
Revkin, A Series of Lapses Preceded Oil Gusher, N.Y. TIMES DOT EARTH BLOG (June 6, 
2010, 9:08 AM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/a-series-of-lapses-
preceded-oil-gusher (noting the inclusion of walruses in the BP’s Gulf oil-spill response 
plan as an absurdity); Robert Mackey, Live Blogging Congressional Testimony From 
Oil Executives, N.Y. TIMES LEDE BLOG (June 15, 2010, 11:36 AM), 
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/live-blogging-oil-executives-in-congress/ 
(noting the pointed questioning regarding walruses from Rep. Markey, Chair of the 
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, to BP executives). 
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the disaster was ultimately avoidable.177 Specifically, the 
commission’s report found that (1) mistakes, both 
governmental and private, onshore and on the Deepwater 
Horizon rig itself, increased the risk of a well blowout; (2) the 
cumulative risk resulting from these decisions and actions was 
as unreasonably large as it was foreseeable; and (3) the risk of 
a catastrophic blowout manifested on April 20 and several of 
the cited mistakes were contributing factors to the blowout.178 
Ultimately, the disaster resulted from clear mistakes made in 
the first instance by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean, and, 
subsequently, by U.S. government officials. These officials, 
relying heavily on the oil industry’s assertions regarding the 
safety of their operations, failed to create and apply a program 
of sufficient regulatory oversight to minimize the risks 
associated with deepwater drilling.179  
By mid-July 2010, BP’s incurred costs reached nearly $4 
billion.180 Under pressure from the Obama administration,181 BP, 
to compensate victims of the spill, pledged an additional $20 
billion to an escrow account—an account administered by a BP-
appointed and Obama-administration-approved arbiter.182 As 
late as February 2011, however, BP objected to the settlement 
terms between the arbiter and victims, claiming that the terms 
were too generous.183 Regardless of these costs, the ultimate cost 
to restore the natural resources in the Gulf will be far higher. 
In addition to the cleanup process,184 the NRDA process 
has begun.185 NOAA coordinates with the Trustees per OPA 
  
 177 NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE 
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 
122-27 (2011), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/deepwater/deepwater.pdf [hereinafter 
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 178 Id. at 115. 
 179 Id. at 127. 
 180 Times Topics, BP Plc., N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/ 
business/companies/bp_plc/index.html (last updated May 4, 2011). 
 181 David E. Sanger, Twisting Arms at BP, Obama Sets Off a Debate on 
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/06/18/us/18assess.html. 
 182 Jackie Calmes & Helene Cooper, BP Chief to Express Contrition in 
Remarks to Panel, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/us/politics/17obama.html. 
 183 John Schwartz, BP Says Spill Settlement Terms Are Too Generous, N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 18, 2011, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/us/18bp.html. 
 184 Joseph Berger, Brian Knowlton & Henry Fountain, Dispersal of Oil Means 
Cleanup to Take Years, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/06/08/us/08spill.html. 
 185 See generally FRAMEWORK FOR EARLY RESTORATION ADDRESSING INJURIES 
RESULTING FROM THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL (2011), available at 
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requirements.186 The Deepwater Horizon Trustees include the 
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the 
DOI, the Department of Commerce, the Bureau of Land 
Management, and designated state trustee agencies for the 
states of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.187 
As of February 2011, NOAA is engaged in the preliminary 
assessment phase.188 While both Trustees and RPs provide oil-
exposure data to the public, which hastens the restoration 
process,189 “they reserve the right to withhold information from 
[those] studies” in which either party contests the results.190 
Withholding information is clearly inconsistent with standard 
scientific investigation.191 The practice of withholding 
  
http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/framework-for-early-
restoration-04212011.pdf. 
 186 15 C.F.R. § 990 (2010). 
 187 Matthew P. Coglianese, The Importance of Determining Potential Chronic 
Natural Resource Damages from the Deepwater Horizon Accident, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 
NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,100, 11,101 (2010). Coglianese points out that “efforts to 
understand chronic, sublethal, and cumulative effects have only begun.” Id. at 11,100. 
He introduces the legal and regulatory framework that will allow the government to 
hold parties responsible for the natural resource damage in the Gulf of Mexico. Id. 
With regard to the current federal assessment, and the Damage Assessment, 
Remediation, and Restoration Program (DAARP), “[i]ndependent researchers have 
claimed that the ‘big money’ for NRDA research, access to information, and information 
dissemination are controlled too tightly by the federal government and by BP.” Id. at 
11,104. One researcher stated:  
The problem is that researchers for BP and the government are kept quiet, and 
their data is unavailable to the rest of the community. When damages to the 
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data to make a fair judgment. Transparency is vital to successful science: 
researchers must subject their proposals to the scrutiny of colleagues, and 
publications require peer review. 
Id. 
 188 See BP Oil Spill: About the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, NOAA: GULF 
SPILL RESTORATION: DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, REMEDIATION & RESTORATION PROGRAM, 
http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/oil-spill/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2011); NRDA 
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RESTORETHEGULF.GOV (Apr. 21, 2011, 12:05 PM), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/ 
release/2011/04/21/nrda-trustees-announce-1-billion-agreement-fund-early-gulf-coast-
restoration-proj. 
 189 Linda Hooper-Bui, Op-Ed, A Gulf Science Blackout, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 
2010, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/25/opinion/25hooper-
Bui.html (discussing the importance of transparency in scientific studies concerning 
the spill as critical to a speedy restoration of the Gulf). 
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Spill’s Impacts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/08/18/ 
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NATURE NEWS (July 28, 2010), http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100728/full/466538a.html. 
 191 Petersen, supra note 190 (Noting the importance of the withheld scientific 
data, Tom Brosnan, an environmental scientist with NOAA, argues that “[t]his is a 
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information stems from the myriad lawsuits the disaster 
prompted192—much of the data will provide material support for 
the Trustees’ and RPs’ legal strategies. These legal strategies 
hinge on the retention of scientific expert witnesses193 (many of 
whom also engage in the NRDA process), and result in the 
systematic withholding of essential information. Only after the 
NRDA restoration plan is approved, or litigation is exhausted, 
will the parties disclose oil-exposure data.194 Paradoxically, 
“[m]itigating the long term impact of the oil spill . . . require[s] 
an open exchange of scientific data and analysis.”195 Keeping 
such data confidential will likely result in delaying Gulf 
restoration.196 As the BP case illustrates, in the Environmental 
Era that is supposed to be collaborative, any move toward 
cooperation is strained, at best. 
III. EPSTEIN’S NEW GOVERNANCE MODEL, GE, AND BP 
This section applies Epstein’s modes of social control to 
the GE and BP cases. The analysis in this section lays the 
groundwork for the recommendations in Part IV, which 
support the narrow goal of incentivizing cooperative NRDA and 
affirming broader New Governance principles, especially 
increased transparency and accountability.  
In an open and democratic society, an engaged civil 
society, working in tandem with a vigilant and responsible 
media, is critical in highlighting unethical corporate behavior 
and spurring change. These two modes are essential forms of 
social control in both the GE and BP cases. In the GE case, 
environmentalists’ engagement has pressured government 
  
very pointed investigation into what has been injured, what has been lost and what is 
required to compensate the public.”) 
 192 Id.; Robert B. Gagosian & Christopher F. D’Elia, Research on Gulf Oil Spill 
Shouldn’t Take a Backseat to Litigation, WASH. POST (July 27, 2010), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/26/AR2010072604443.html 
(discussing the link between filing lawsuits against BP and the withholding of scientific data). 
 193 See Gagosian & D’Elia, supra note 192. Stan Stenner, the director of 
conservation science at the Ocean Conservancy, noted the typicality of hiring experts 
following an ecological disaster. He explained that this is “par for the 
course . . . . [a]nytime you have an event like this, everyone goes out and recruits 
experts.” Petersen, supra note 190. Noting the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska 
and Exxon’s aggressive campaign to hire experts, Senner offered that the expert’s 
“mission was not to find out what the harm was from the spill; their mission was to 
cast doubt on any conclusions drawn about harm from the spill.” Id. 
 194 Gagosian & D’Elia, supra note 192. 
 195 Petersen, supra note 190. 
 196 Gagosian & D’Elia, supra note 192. 
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actors to force GE’s cleanup and restoration.197 Scenic Hudson, 
Friends of a Clean Hudson, New York Public Interest Research 
Group, The Riverkeepers, and the local chapter of the Sierra 
Club have been especially tenacious.198  
The media, including the New York Times, have 
exhibited both vigilance and responsibility in providing 
information. Reporters exposed deficiencies in GE’s cleanup 
and restoration efforts. Journalists have also been willing to 
highlight GE’s illegal and unethical behavior,199 including GE’s 
continually obstinate and adversarial behavior. For example, 
GE launched a public relations campaign arguing “that the risk 
of leaving PCBs in the silt was very low, while the cost of 
dredging the contaminated bottom would be very high, possibly 
costing as much as several hundred million dollars.”200 This 
media campaign garnered some support, which meant that 
some members of an engaged, albeit misinformed, civil society 
stood with GE and wanted to prevent dredging.  
Regarding BP, an engaged conglomeration of regional 
elected officials,201 concerned citizens,202 environmentalists,203 and 
myriad others spoke through a vigilant media to pressure BP 
and government actors into mounting a transparent and 
sustained cleanup effort. For example, concerned by a 
“disinformation campaign” BP waged to underestimate the 
impacts of the spill and the United States’ lethargic response to 
it,204 James Carville, a former strategist for President Clinton 
  
 197 See supra text accompanying note 121. 
 198 KAMIENIECKI, supra note 113, at 147. 
 199 Epstein, supra note 14. 
 200 KAMIENIECKI, supra note 113, at 147. 
 201 See, e.g., Drew Jubera, ‘America’s Bubba’: Is Nungesser an Oil Folk Hero or an 
Opportunist?, CNN (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/08/03/billy.nungesser. 
oil.disaster/index.html (depicting Louisiana Plaqemines Parish President Billy Nungesser’s 
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[w]hat [Nungesser] brings to the table is something visceral and raw and brave 
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strikes—he calls it the way he sees it. He’s able to go after BP and the Obama 
administration with equal fury. People are counting on him to be the last 
uncompromised man in Louisiana. 
Id. 
 202 Campbell Robertson, Scope and Pace of Gulf Cleanup Is Criticized, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 8, 2011, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/us/08spill.html 
(detailing the efforts of individuals to keep the limelight on BP’s cleanup efforts). 
 203 Id. 
 204 James Carville, Louisiana Demands Justice, Not Charity, CNN (June 13, 
2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-06-13/opinion/carville.louisiana.justice_1_sediment-
wetlands-barrier-islands?_s=PM:OPINION. 
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and current Gulf resident,205 famously challenged the Obama 
administration on Good Morning America. He stated: “Man, 
you got to get down here and take control of this! Put somebody 
in charge of this thing and get this moving. We’re about to die 
down here!”206 When making one of several appearances on 
Anderson Cooper 360, Billy Nungesser, the combative Parish 
President from Louisiana,207 illustrated the mutually reinforcing 
nature of media and society. Recounting a conversation with 
President Obama, Mr. Nungesser indicated that the White 
House took note of Mr. Cooper’s vigilant presence and 
broadcasts in the Gulf. Mr. Nungesser stated, “[The President] 
made me commit and I agreed that, if we have the same mess-
up in chain of command, or things not getting done, that I will 
give him a call at the White House before I call you, Anderson.”208 
Weeks later, Mr. Carville wrote an op-ed piece noting the much-
improved and vigorous government response: 
We need our government to remain vigilant in addressing this. We need 
a lot of research into the science of the effects of the spill. And in the 
words of Interior Secretary Ken Salazar, we need to continue to have 
the heel of our boot on the neck of BP. . . . [We] need to stay vigilant and 
aggressive in being sure that the inevitable “It’s time to move on” 
mentality does not set in. Trust me. The last thing we need to do is move 
on until our precious coastline is both restored and renewed.209 
  
 205 James Carville was chief strategist for Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential 
campaign. Carville is a resident of New Orleans, Louisiana, where he teaches political 
science at Tulane University. Press Release, Tulane University, James Carville Joins 
Faculty (Nov. 8, 2008), available at http://admission.tulane.edu/livecontent/news/28-
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Response, N.Y. TIMES CAUCUS BLOG (Aug. 6, 2010, 1:27 PM), 
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That particularly pained the White House, where Mr. Carville has many friends from 
the Clinton campaigns and presidency, most notably, of course, the White House chief 
of staff, Rahm Emanuel.”). 
 206 Jake Tapper & Huma Khan, ‘Political Stupidity’: Democrat James Carville 
Slams Obama’s Response to BP Oil Spill, ABC NEWS (May 26, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
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 207 See Robertson, supra note 202 (characterizing the combative style of 
Nungesser and describing him as “pugnacious”). 
 208 Brian Stelter, Cooper Becomes Loud Voice for Gulf Residents, N.Y. TIMES, June 
18, 2010, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/18/us/18cooper.html. 
 209 James Carville, Op-Ed, Obama Played His Cards Right on BP, CNN (Aug. 
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obama-administration-president-obama?_s=PM:OPINION. 
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Mr. Carville also commended the President’s successful 
negotiation with BP that resulted in a $20 billion fund to 
compensate the spill’s victims.210 
Accepting Mr. Carville’s overture, the White House sent 
a copy of Mr. Carville’s essay to reporters.211 To this day, an 
engaged civil society and a vigilant and responsible media, 
working in tandem, continue to keep Gulf cleanup and 
restoration issues in the limelight.  
Law, the articulation of public policy enforced by 
government,212 provided the foundation for environmentalists’ 
and journalists’ work in both the GE and BP cases. CERCLA, 
as a mode of social control, was designed to address just the 
kind of scenario the GE case presents213: to hold RPs 
accountable for cleaning hazardous-waste areas and restoring 
natural resources.214 But law is complex. GE’s adversarial 
stance on cleanup and restoration is consistent with the 
incentives built into CERCLA’s design.215 CERCLA, at its 
foundation, assumes an adversarial relationship between 
Trustees and RPs. Moreover, GE used law to delay its response 
to the PCB discharges and to challenge the constitutionality of 
CERCLA.216 Though that litigation strategy ultimately ended in 
failure in 2010,217 legal mechanisms provided GE with the 
opportunity to both deny its responsibility for polluting the 
Hudson River and then defend its pollution for decades.  
Similarly, law constitutes a necessary foundation to 
restore the Gulf. Like CERCLA, Congress tailored OPA to 
respond to the precise scenario the Deepwater Horizon incident 
presents.218 Although OPA, in contrast to CERCLA, 
incorporates “cooperation” in its text, the specter of litigation is 
real. Consequently, restoration processes under OPA are best 
described as adversarial. As mentioned, the RPs and Trustees 
are now locked in a “battle of the experts”219 whereby both sides 
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will rely on experts to prove their case. Trustees will attempt to 
maximize financial damages and RPs will attempt to minimize 
them.220 This predictable dynamic, which the systematic 
withholding of scientific data compounds, all but eviscerates 
the cooperative elements of OPA. Counterintuitively, these 
“cooperative” efforts delay Gulf restoration.221 Legislative 
changes to OPA that incentivize genuine cooperation may 
change the dynamic between RPs and Trustees.222  
Epstein’s three remaining modes—affinity group 
regulation, self-regulation, and ethical precepts—did little to 
harness responsible corporate behavior from GE or BP. Recall 
that affinity group regulation refers to standards of behavior 
established by members of a particular profession, such as 
medicine.223 The case studies noted above evoke no sign of 
professional influence. In the GE case, managers developed a 
stonewalling strategy.224 In the BP case, managers decided how 
the company would engage with Trustees and the public. 
Management is a practice, not a profession.225 Management has 
not yet formally recognized a duty to serve the greater good, nor 
has management adopted an ethics code.226 Not surprisingly, 
then, managers in the two industries considered here, electrical 
manufacturing and oil, have not developed professional codes to 
articulate how their work will consider the stakeholders’ needs.  
Self-regulation is the voluntary adherence to standards 
set by NGOs concerned with specific issues, such as climate 
change.227 In the GE case, consider a scenario where Scenic 
Hudson had created standards for hazardous-waste disposal 
and GE had voluntarily complied with those standards in good 
faith. This would have been an act of self-regulation. In the 
real scenario, though, environmentalists seemed to know they 
  
 220 KAMIENIECKI, supra note 113, at 147 (describing the incentives at play 
when litigation looms). 
 221 Id. 
 222 Id. 
 223 See Epstein, supra note 14, at 210-11. 
 224  See supra text accompanying notes 118-20. 
 225 Henry Mintzberg, The MBA Menace, FASTCOMPANY.COM (June 1, 2004), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/83/mbamenace.html. Arguing that “no one can 
become a manager in the classroom,” Mintzberg notes that management is a “craft” 
tempered by experience. Id. 
 226 Thomas Kostigen, The Business Oath: Commentary—Let’s Strive for a 
More Ethical 2011, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.marketwatch.com/ 
story/heres-to-more-ethical-business-practices-2010-12-31. Professions such as law and 
medicine have recognized their duty to contribute to society. Moreover, they have 
adopted and enforced codes of conduct. Id. 
 227 See Epstein, supra note 14, at 211. 
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were in for a long fight from the start.228 They did not seek 
voluntary compliance with guidelines. 
“Ethics” highlights beliefs derived from religion, 
humanistic philosophy, social customs, mores, and traditions.229 
Ethical precepts can harness excellence in corporate behavior. 
Today, for instance, GE’s Ecomagination campaign inspires “the 
brightest minds to collaborate, invest and innovate” in clean 
energy.230 Although business interests necessarily provide the 
primary foundation for the campaign, GE’s statements about 
clean energy suggest that the company values the environment, 
and that GE has an obligation to consider the needs of future 
generations.231 These statements, at a minimum, reflect GE’s 
ethical awareness. Unfortunately, GE’s Ecomagination is 
entirely forward-looking: the plan disregards the Hudson River 
disaster.232 In fact, GE’s restoration strategy is decidedly 
unimaginative. From CERCLA’s passage, in 1980, to 2002, GE 
stonewalled and continually avoided action that would restore 
the natural resources the corporation damaged or destroyed. 
Ironically, during the stonewalling years, Jack Welch’s 
rationalizations for stall tactics were peppered with words that 
hint at an awareness of CSR principles. In essence, he asserted 
that GE was “doing the right thing” by doing nothing. Welch 
stood his ground against natural resource restoration by stating 
that he wanted the “truth” to win out.233 Regrettably, Welch’s 
truth was that GE had a right to refrain from restoration 
because PCBs were not harmful.234 After Welch retired in 2001, 
GE’s new CEO, Jeffrey R. Immelt, changed strategies and 
  
 228 See supra notes 116-34 and accompanying text. 
 229 See Epstein, supra note 14, at 211-12. 
 230 Press, GE: ECOMAGINATION, http://206.155.64.41/news/press-page/#content 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
 231 Id. 
 232 Although the company did agree to go ahead with Phase 2. 
 233  JACK WELCH & JOHN A. BYRNE, JACK: STRAIGHT FROM THE GUT 283 (2003) 
(“But I take great pride . . . our people get up every morning all over the world and 
compete like hell with absolute integrity . . . . [Our people] see no conflict between 
taking on the world’s best, every day, all over the globe, giving 110 percent and more—
to compete and win and grow—and at the same time maintain an instinctive, 
unbendable, commitment to absolute integrity in everything we do.”). 
 234 Id. at 283-94. Welch noted: 
Nothing is more important than a company’s integrity . . . . It not only means 
that people must abide by the letter and spirit of the law, it also means doing 
the right thing and fighting for what you believe is right. . . . On PCBs, we’ve 
assured ourselves that they are not harmful to our employees or our neighbors. 
Id. at 284. 
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moved towards ending the dispute.235 Perhaps as a more neutral 
outsider, Immelt could see that the stonewalling would have to 
end because it became clear that PCBs were, in fact, harmful.236  
Self-regulation and ethical precepts were similarly 
unhelpful modes of social control in BP’s case. Certain company 
actions do suggest that BP has at times had self-regulation or 
ethical precepts in mind. For example, under former BP CEO 
John Browne, the company unveiled a new motto, “Beyond 
Petroleum.” The motto accompanies an “insignia of a blooming 
flower,” an image meant “to portray the company as 
one . . . responsive to growing public concerns [regarding] 
climate change.”237  
Unfortunately, though, BP’s new motto and logo seem 
more about marketing than responsible behavior. In reality, BP 
“has a worse health, environment[,] and safety record than 
many other major oil companies”;238 the Deepwater Horizon oil 
spill is only the latest costly blunder in a larger series. The 
company does not demonstrate the proactive stance inherent in 
corporations that self-regulate and act ethically. Indeed, despite 
a catalog of crises and near catastrophes in recent years, BP 
demonstrates a chronic inability or unwillingness to learn from 
its mistakes.239 Three incidents are especially significant. 
In 2005, an explosion at a BP refinery in Texas City, 
Texas, killed fourteen workers and injured many more.240 In its 
investigation, the government discovered more than 300 safety 
  
 235 Revkin, supra note 106. 
 236 GE demonstrated an escalating commitment to a losing course of action. It 
is possible GE decided to stick with its stance on PCBs because acknowledging that 
PCBs are harmful would have made Welch’s initial decision seem incorrect or bad. See 
LINDA K. TREVINO & KATHERINE A. NELSON, MANAGING BUSINESS ETHICS: STRAIGHT 
TALK ABOUT HOW TO DO IT RIGHT 91 (5th ed. 2011) (discussing decision makers’ 
tendency to consider sunk costs in determining whether to escalate a commitment). 
 237 See Krauss, supra note 158. 
 238 Jad Mouawad, For BP, a History of Spills and Safety Lapses, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 9, 2010, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/business/ 
09bp.html; see also Sarah Lyall, In BP’s Record, a History of Boldness and Costly 
Blunders, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/07/13/business/energy-environment/13bprisk.html; Pierre Thomas et al., BP’s 
Dismal Safety Record, ABC NEWS (May 27, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/bps-
dismal-safety-record/story?id=10763042. 
 239 Robbie Brown, Panel Presses BP on Its Safety Record, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 
2010, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/us/27hearings.html (Noting 
the serial safety violations in BP’s history, Capt. Hung Nguyen of the Coast Guard, who is 
also part of a team of federal investigators questioning BP’s record, commented to BP 
officials that “one dot is a point, two dots in a line, and three dots is a trend. . . . There’s a 
trend there about the safety culture of BP. These things keep happening.”) 
 240 14 Die in Massive Explosion at Texas City Refinery, CLICK2HOUSTON (Mar. 
23, 2005), http://www.click2houston.com/news/4311459/detail.html. 
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violations,241 and BP agreed to pay $21 million in fines, which, 
at the time, was an industry record.242 Telas Group, a consulting 
firm contracted to examine conditions at the facility, reported 
that they “ha[d] never seen a site where the notion ‘I could die 
today’ was so real.”243 After inspectors from the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) revisited the Texas 
City facility in 2009, they discovered more than seven hundred 
safety violations and proposed a record fine of $87 million.244 
OSHA stated that many of the penalties stemmed from BP’s 
failure to meet its responsibilities under the previous Texas 
City settlement.245 Ultimately, in August 2010, BP agreed to 
pay $50 million to settle penalties for its failure to correct 
safety issues between 2005 and 2009.246 This was another record 
fine for the industry.247  
In another incident, Thunder Horse, a platform in the 
deepwater Gulf of Mexico, was vulnerable when Hurricane 
Dennis passed over the platform in 2005.248 Thunder Horse, a 
$1 billion crowning glory in deepwater-drilling technology, 
listed (or tilted) precariously to one side and appeared to be 
sinking.249 Investigations later revealed that a backwards-
installed valve caused the vessel to flood, imperiling the project 
before any oil was pumped.250  
Finally, in 2006, a cracked BP oil pipeline in Alaska 
forced one of the nation’s largest oil fields, Prudhoe Bay, to 
shut down. BP was subsequently fined $20 million after 
prosecutors demonstrated BP’s negligent maintenance of the 
pipeline.251 Prudhoe Bay Oil Field remains vulnerable to an 
  
 241 Federal Contractor Misconduct Database: BP P.L.C. Workplace Safety Violations, 
POGO.ORG, http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,222,html?CaseID=387 (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
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accident that industry insiders believe could rival the 
Deepwater Horizon spill.252  
Given BP’s continuing struggle to comply with current 
laws, there remains little to suggest that the company is capable 
of adopting any heightened standard, whether derived from 
NGOs or affinity groups (which have yet to exist). Moreover, BP’s 
accident history makes unlikely the possibility that the company 
will avail itself of any argument that it ought to behave ethically. 
To date, Epstein’s final three modes have proven ineffective at 
incentivizing BP to engage in responsible corporate behavior.253  
As we think beyond GE and BP, it is useful to consider 
what typically incentivizes positive corporate behavior.254 
Generally, corporations with an international presence tend to 
prefer reputation-saving self-regulation to government 
intervention.255 GE and BP are exceptions to this generalization. 
When thinking about Epstein’s modes of social control and New 
Governance in general, these principles are best considered in 
the context of a particular company’s history—its record of 
success and failure, and its past responses to failure, in 
particular.256 Although both GE and BP have resisted 
government intervention and made attempts to create a 
positive environmental reputation, any self-imposed strategies 
have lacked substance. Further, for both companies, the stakes 
of owning up to real problems are high. GE has several 
Superfund sites waiting to be restored.257 Any self-imposed 
regulation obligates the company to continue cleaning and 
restoring with no limit to the corporate spending necessary to 
become a solid environmental citizen.258 BP has already 
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invested so much in one particular strategy—aggressive cost 
cutting combined with aggressive moves to increase market 
share by capitalizing on its expertise in deepwater drilling—
that even the Deepwater Horizon disaster is unlikely to inspire 
a major shift in corporate culture.  
IV. GETTING TO RESTORATION: LOOKING BEYOND THE 
HUDSON AND GULF 
Ideally, GE would have voluntarily assumed 
responsibility to remedy natural-resource injuries in the 
Hudson River. If GE voluntary engaged in cooperative NRDA, 
this behavior would have demonstrated a commitment to New 
Governance principles and, moreover, demonstrated corporate 
integrity.259 GE needed the courage of its convictions in 
sustainable value creation. The company waited too long to 
demonstrate a commitment to using its “Ecomagination” and 
resources to efficiently and sustainably restore the Hudson River. 
Similarly, BP is poised for adversarial, rather than cooperative, 
NRDA. The significance of BP’s decision to embrace adversarial 
strategies is that doing so prevents Trustees and RPs from getting 
to restoration. BP still has the power to demonstrate corporate 
integrity and a commitment to New Governance principles. 
Modeling a new approach would set an example for future work 
in responding to environmental disasters.260  
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The following section provides three concrete 
recommendations to make cooperative NRDA more likely. The 
first addresses cooperative NRDA directly. The second and third 
suggestions affirm broader New Governance principles. All three 
recommendations, however, rely on New Governance theory.  
A. Recommendation One: Amend CERCLA and OPA to 
Incentivize Cooperation 
Scientists and policymakers who advocate cooperative 
NRDA generally see OPA’s statutory language as superior to 
CERCLA’s because OPA incorporates the concept of 
“cooperation” in more than one provision of the statute.261 
Fundamentally, however, both CERCLA and OPA assume that 
decisions about NRDA and restoration will likely be made 
through, or as a consequence of, litigation. As mentioned, while 
both Trustees and RPs provide scientific data to the public, 
they reserve the right to withhold information from studies in 
which either party contests the results.262 This practice results 
in the systematic withholding of data until litigation is 
exhausted. Consequently, restoration is delayed.263 Since NRDA 
takes place in the context of litigation as the default dispute-
settling mechanism,264 the end game is still defined by victory 
for the opposing party, no matter the gloss of civility that 
opposing sides create during the NRDA process. That is, the 
cleanup and restoration of injured natural resources is not the 
primary motivation: attorneys dominate and control the NRDA 
  
reliability organization with highly reliable systems, or actions reflective of 
complacency, excessive risk-taking, and a loss of situational awareness.  
Id. app. A at 7 & 9.  
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among local citizens, industry, and government. See Introduction, PRINCE WILLIAM 
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 262 See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 263 See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 264 See Franklin D. Strier, Major Problems Endemic to the Adversary System 
and Proposed Reforms, 19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 463, 464 (1992). 
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process.265 Partisan advocates are supposed to be diligent, 
productive contributors to finding the truth. However, scholars 
who study the costs and benefits of an adversarial system have 
established defects in the truth-finding process; most notably, 
lawyers hell-bent on victory are not incentivized to aid the 
court in discovering all the facts.266  
Attorneys influence both Trustees and RPs,267 which 
means that both sides are incentivized to consider factors other 
than reaching restoration. Certainly, RPs are concerned with 
costs, and are therefore encouraged to use adversarial flaws to 
gain the lowest judgment possible. But Trustees are also equally 
vulnerable to flaws in the adversarial system. For example, 
Trustees are not clearly bound by fiduciary duties268 to protect 
natural resources even if that means revealing the complete 
truth (e.g., that some natural resources have not, in fact, been 
harmed by a hazardous release). Given the disincentives of 
seeking justice through the adversarial system, there is no 
wonder that critics of the current NRDA process blame its 
defects on dueling lawyers and their expert scientists, who 
demonstrate considerable skill at generating evidence with a 
particular objective in mind—a favorable outcome for the client. 
One significant change to both CERCLA and OPA would 
set the stage to get to restoration faster and more efficiently. 
Congress, or the EPA in its regulatory capacity, should move 
the locus of control269 in evidence-gathering to a judge or other 
neutral party, rather than an attorney.270 Under this system, a 
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judge or other neutral party would oversee (1) the selection of 
an independent panel of scientists to engage in NRDA and (2) 
the approval of a defined budget for the NRDA process. In 
other words, from the beginning, an objective party would set 
the parameters of the NRDA process. Shifting control from 
dueling attorneys to a process with judicial oversight supports 
the classic both-and agenda: it would achieve substantive 
improvements in environmental protection and accommodate 
all stakeholders’ legitimate concerns in the economic and social 
costs of implementing both CERCLA and OPA.271 
B. Recommendation Two: Consider Science as a Mode of 
Social Control in New Governance Frameworks 
Science, similar to vigilant and responsible media, could 
serve as a mode of social control to encourage positive corporate 
behavior.272 As Jane Lubchenco has stated, “[O]ne of the most 
important roles of science is to inform, to provide information, 
so that decision makers can take that information into 
consideration and understand the full ramifications of a course 
of action.”273 Science as a mode of social control, used alone or in 
tandem with other modes, could incent ethical behavior by 
offering factual truth—truth that informs the public about the 
consequences of corporate behavior. Considering science as a 
mode of social control is consistent with the historical view of 
science as a producer of reliable knowledge. 
The role of science in society historically focused on the 
production of “reliable knowledge” toward understanding the 
world and solving practical problems.274 According to 
Lubchenco, the relationship between science and society is 
predicated upon an unwritten social contract—a commitment 
that scientists will not only create new knowledge but also 
communicate knowledge broadly so citizens and policymakers 
  
 271 See Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA: 
Failures, Lessons Learned, and Alternatives, 38 N.M. L. REV. 409 (2008) (exploring 
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C81, C84 (1999). 
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can use the knowledge to make informed decisions.275 
Importantly, the form of research Lubchenco had in mind 
assumes that research will stay true to the ideals of inquiry, 
rather than advocacy.  
Some scholars distinguish the “plain-and-simple 
inquirer” from the “advocacy researcher” and suggest that 
individuals view these two types of truth seekers as two 
extremes of a continuum.276 The inquirer seeks all evidence, looks 
for answers, and finds answers, no matter what the answers 
turn out to be. The inquirer is likely to generate reliable 
evidence.277 The advocacy researcher, by contrast, may “minimize 
the importance of unfavorable evidence he/she can ignore or 
explain away.”278 In other words, “[S]cientific work can be 
distorted and impeded when it gets entangled with litigation.”279 
Advocacy research is inconsistent with disinterested research. 
Indeed, advocacy research is much more likely to be biased.280 
Consequently, advocacy research is often termed “lawsuit 
science,” “junk science,” or “litigation-driven science.”281 Any 
research “skewed by the desire to advance one side in litigation” 
raises legitimate issues of scientific integrity.282  
Federal Rules of Evidence283 and state equivalents284 give 
courts the power to appoint experts at their discretion. In other 
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words, judges are not required to rely on experts presented by 
adversarial parties. For example, the Court-Appointed Scientific 
Experts Project of the American Academy for the Advancement 
of Science aids in the process of determining the truth.285 As the 
previous recommendation indicates, courts should convene 
independent panels of scientists to conduct the research needed 
to get to restoration effectively and efficiently. Together, these 
first two recommendations repair fundamental flaws in both 
CERCLA and OPA implementation, as both statutes currently 
incentivize Trustees and RPs to prepare for court battle.286  
C. Recommendation Three: Increase Corporate Disclosure 
Requirements 
Investors and consumers expect voluntary corporate 
disclosures about both environmental performance and green 
initiatives. These disclosures should be clear, accurate, and 
complete. Moreover, these disclosures should be internally 
consistent. For example, when BP ranks number twenty-five in 
the top 100 “toxic companies”287 while touting its commitment to 
sustainability, BP ought to explain this apparent inconsistency. 
New Governance principles provide guidance to remove these 
inconsistencies. In particular, ethical precepts require clear, 
accurate, and complete disclosure. When corporate actors fail to 
“walk the talk,” a vigilant and responsible media is likely to offer 
the transparency that corporations fail to provide. When 
patterns of secrecy and inconsistency become clear, investors 
and consumers act. In response, they expect state and federal 
legislators and regulators to intervene on their behalf.  
Legal scholars should urge the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) 
to articulate and enforce public policy via laws and regulations 
that (1) prevent deception and unfairness in the marketplace288 
  
 285 AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., COURT APPOINTED SCIENTIFIC 
EXPERTS: A HANDBOOK FOR EXPERTS (2002), available at http://www.aaas.org/ 
spp/case/handbookv2.pdf. 
 286 Ian Yarett, Weird Science, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 30, 2010, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/08/30/is-research-into-the-oil-spill-s-impact-
skewed.html; see also Gagosian & D’Elia, supra note 192. 
 287 Toxic 100 Air Polluters, POL. ECON. RES. INST. (Mar. 2010), 
http://www.peri.umass.edu/toxic_index/. 
 288 See Elizabeth K. Coppolecchia, Note, The Greenwashing Deluge: Who Will 
Rise Above the Waters of Deceptive Advertising?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1353 (2010) 
(considering regulation and litigation in response to greenwashing claims). 
2011] COOPERATIVE NRDA & NEW GOVERNANCE 147 
and (2) encourage informed investment decisions.289 The FTC 
already guides marketers to refrain from using general terms 
such as “environmentally-friendly.”290 Currently, the FTC is 
proposing guidelines to marketers that want to use product 
certifications and seals of approval.291 The FTC’s proposed 
regulations make clear that marketers cannot deceive 
consumers by implying that an independent third party 
certifies their products.292 The FTC gives an example. If a 
company that places a label (a “GreenLogo for Environmental 
Excellence,” for instance) on a product, that company may 
mislead consumers to believe that an independent third party 
awarded the seal.293 In short, the FTC may provide effective 
tools to regulate transparency in corporations’ environmental 
policies. Unfortunately, the FTC’s power in this space does not 
extend beyond product marketing. 
The SEC also requires accurate disclosure. The SEC 
asks companies to disclose material information to potential 
investors.294 When companies file reports with the SEC, they 
must include accurate information on environmental risks and 
liabilities.295 Generally, though, public companies have not been 
forthcoming about environmental risks.296 
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Currently, investor organizations and researchers are 
asking for increased transparency from corporations.297 In 
essence, they expect the SEC to improve monitoring compliance 
with environmental disclosure requirements.298 The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act empowers regulators to increase expectations of 
corporations with regard to transparency, including 
transparency about environmental information.299 In particular, 
companies should inform investors and the public about all 
environmental risks: for GE, transparency in the Hudson’s PCB 
dredging; for BP, transparency in the cleanup and restoration of 
natural resources in the Gulf. For companies beyond GE and 
BP, this might include transparency in how a particular 
company plans to prevent environmental disasters and how the 
company would act should it face an environmental crisis.  
CONCLUSION 
Considerations regarding the role and place of nature in 
human life are more important today than ever before.300 RPs 
have a duty to safeguard the corporation’s welfare—which 
obligates them to balance the multiple, and sometimes 
conflicting, claims of stakeholders, including shareholders, 
employees, and residents of local communities. Trustees have a 
duty to act on behalf of the public, restoring, rehabilitating, 
replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of injured resources and 
services after releases of pollutants. As a society, we have made 
considerable progress in environmental protection by asking 
government regulators to command and control. More recently, 
a wide range of stakeholders have asked for more collaborative, 
cooperative approaches that are flexible enough to respond to 
the particular facts of an environmental situation. 
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 300 Lubchenco, supra note 272, writes:  
We are beginning to understand that human health is an environmental issue, 
that social justice is an environmental issue, that the economy is in reality an 
environmental issue, and even national security is an environmental issue. As 
we begin to appreciate the fundamental ways that humans are dependent upon 
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In NRDA specifically, the promise of cooperative NRDA—
expedited processes with reduced overall costs and improved 
solutions—has yet to be realized. Flaws in the law and the limited 
usefulness of other avenues of social control have created hurdles. 
Hurdles include litigious railroading, lack of neutral scientific 
information, and weak disclosure requirements. These hurdles 
have impeded effective collaboration and, in turn, delayed New 
Governance principles from taking complete effect.  
We expect little debate about whether cooperative 
NRDA and New Governance are worthwhile ideas. We do, 
however, expect arguments over the solutions we have 
suggested: (1) reforming CERCLA and OPA to incentivize 
cooperation, (2) reframing science as a mode of social control, 
and (3) increasing corporate disclosure requirements. These 
recommendations change the status quo, and change is difficult 
even when necessary. By putting a stop to feuding between RPs 
and Trustees, insisting on neutral science that inspires better 
behavior, and asking companies to demonstrate more 
transparency, RPs and Trustees will be poised to comply with 
their duties and meet their responsibilities to get to restoration 
in U.S. waterways. Moreover, the recommendations we suggest 
support corporate behavior that is environmentally and socially 
responsible. 
